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Copyright and the Musical Arrangement: An
Analysis of the Law and Problems Pertaining to
This Specialized Form of Derivative Work*
This comment defines the particular problems inherent in the application
of copyright law to the musical arrangement by examining the practical
realities and workings of the recording industry. The author considers
such areas as compulsory licensing, imitation of artist style, and adapta-
tion for commercial performance, concluding that further legislation is
necessary to afford a level of protection that is commensurate with the im-
portance of the musical arranger's unique role.
INTRODUCTION
Music today has permeated virtually every aspect of our soci-
ety. It is used for listening, for dancing, and to create moods in
television and the movies. Music is everywhere and, as a result,
the music industry is a billion dollar business. Recent statistics
indicate that the public has invested in over 400 million radio sets
and 125 million television sets. In 1975 alone, 73 million stereos
were purchased.'
From the time the composer first scratches out a few notes on
manuscript paper to the time the public hears it, a song under-
goes many transformations. When the composer first finishes his
work, he probably has a simple melody that can be played in less
than a minute. Before this song reaches any listener, it is orches-
trated or arranged for a particular group of musicians. Even if the
song is played by a single instrument, such as a piano, some type
of arrangement is usually made. Without the musical arrange-
ment, songs would lack variety and would be less adaptable to
different styles of music. 2
It will be the aim of this article to examine the art form known
as the musical arrangement (or orchestration), 3 insofar as it is af-
* This comment received the first place award in the Nathan Burkan Memo-
rial Competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCASP).
1. S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, THIs BusIEss OF MUSIC, viii (3d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY].
2. Id. at 207.
3. The terms arrangement and orchestration are used synonomously in this
comment.
fected by aspects of the copyright law pertaining to its originality,
recording, publishing and performance. First, however, a back-
ground in general music principles will be presented to assist the
reader in understanding more clearly the vital function that an ar-
ranger serves.
THE MUSICAL ARRANGEMENT
The art of arranging or orchestrating music involves more than
merely "dressing up" a song to make it more attractive. In fact,
the term "arranger" is not an accurate one since the arranger also
does a great deal of original composing when writing his4 arrange-
ment.
Arranging music involves a thorough knowledge of the ele-
ments of music5 and of all the various musical instruments. The
arranger must know an instrument's method of sound production,
its range, limitations, faults, and virtues. The arranger must also
possess a well-developed aural memory, that is, the ability to re-
call the sounds of the various instruments, both individually and
in combination.6 Also required is the ability to match the particu-
lar instruments with the melody, harmony, and rhythm.
The arranger is responsible for the "style" of the song's presen-
tation, for the selection of the instruments used in the recording
and, in the case of vocal recordings, for the setting behind the vo-
cal. He generally composes a suitable introduction to the song,
musical interludes, and background harmonies which comple-
ment the melody. Occasionally, the song's original composer
chooses harmonies to the melody which are not as effective as
other harmonies. In such an instance, it is the arranger's job to
alter or add to the original harmonic structure of the song. This
change in the harmony can be as important as the melody itself
since harmony is largely responsible for the mood a song conveys.
The art of arranging music first came to prominence in the
1930's and 1940's during the era of the large dance orchestras. 7
Something was needed to help the public to distinguish one band
4. Masculine pronouns in this comment have been used solely for the sake of
convenience. Wherever appropriate the use of the masculine gender should be
recognized as including feminine gender.
5. The three elements of music are melody, harmony, and rhythm. Melody is
the organized succession of single tones while harmony is the simultaneous occur-
rence of musical tones. Rhythm is that element of musical expression that or-
ganizes successive sounds into accent determined patterns. See generally, M.
BERNSTEIN & M. PICKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUSIC (4th ed. 1972).
6. W. Russo, JAZZ COMPOSITION AND ORCHESTRATION 8 (1968).
7. For an excellent article dealing with the large dance bands and the 1909
Copyright Act see Comment, Copyright Law and the Modern Dance Arrangement,
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481 (1947).
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from another, thus contributing to its commercial success. It was
here that the arranger became the key man in setting the band's
style.8 In the 1950's, the individual singer replaced the "big band"
in popularity, and the arranger was called upon to provide musi-
cal arrangements tailored to a particular vocalist's style.
Music has always been present in the motion pictures. Here
the composer or arranger is responsible for presenting music in a
manner consistent with, and contributing to, the action on the
screen. This music, to a large degree, sets the mood of the movie
and may even be responsible for the movie's success or failure.
Even today, in the era of "rock" and "disco," the arranger is still
present, often arranging for the studio orchestras which assist the
popular rock groups with their recordings.
A musical arrangement or orchestration may not be copy-
righted unless the consent of the copyright owner is obtained.
This is found in the "exclusive rights" sections of both the 1909
and the 1976 Copyright Acts. The 1909 Act, in Sec. 1, provides that
the copyright owner shall have the exclusive right "to arrange or
adapt it if it be a musical work." In the current Act, a musical ar-
rangement is considered a form of "derivative work"9 and it is
within the copyright owner's exclusive power to prepare or au-
thorize "derivative works based on the copyrighted work."' 0
Despite these provisions," the arrangements used in popular
recordings rarely qualify for copyright protection. This is because
8. G. SIMON, THE BIG BANDS 40 (1967).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
10. Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual work, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
11. The following cases have held that a musical arrangement is the subject of
copyright protection: Barron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1949); Ed-
monds v. Stern, 248 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1918); Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (lst Cir. 1886);
Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
the agreement normally used in the recording industry is a stan-
dard mechanical license to record,12 whereby the copyright owner
indicates he will not object if the arrangement is used in a record-
ing. Thus, the copyright owner, who is usually not involved in
preparing or recording the arrangement, does not consent to
copyrighting the arrangement but only permits it to be recorded.13
In the area of music publishing, the situation is somewhat dif-
ferent. The arrangers who work for the music publishers prepare
sheet music versions of the songs which usually have already
been recorded. They also prepare arrangements for bands,
orchestras, jazz ensembles, and vocal groups. Copyrights are ob-
tained here. This is due simply to the fact that publishers gener-
ally own the rights to the musical compositions.14
The arrangers who work for these publishers are either salaried
employees or those who work on an assignment basis. Their ar-
rangements are considered "works made for hire,"' 5 and, as such,
leave the employee with no interest whatsoever in his work. The
music publisher-employer owns all the rights in the arrangement
and is considered to be the author. Consequently, the arranger is
not entitled to any royalties for his creation. Conditions to this ef-
fect are generally provided for in the agreement signed by the
employer and arranger, in which the arranger specifically ac-
knowledges his employee status.' 6
In the area of sound recordings, arrangers may soon be entitled
to a performance royalty. Legislation is currently being consid-
ered which would entitle musicians, vocalists, record companies,
and music preparation people (such as arrangers) to a perform-
ance royalty. If this law is enacted, "discos," broadcasters, and
12. See text accompanying note 60, infra.
13. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 208.
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), defines "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture of other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, and as
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the
foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for publi-
cation as a secondary adjunct work by an author for the purpose of intro-
ducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or
assisting in the use of the other work such as forewords, afterwords, picto-
rial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrange-
ments, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes,
and an "instructional test" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared
for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional ac-
tivities.
16. SHEMEL & KRASI.OVSKY, supra note 1, at 529.
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any others who use recorded works for profit would be required
to pay royalties to the people responsible for the recording, even
though these people have no ownership rights in the copyright.17
Under the current law, only the copyright owners of the songs
themselves are compensated. This is accomplished through li-
censing agreements with performing rights societies, such as AS-
CAP and BMI.18 Considering the importance of the arranger in
the success of a sound recording and the proliferation of the
"disco" (which relies solely on recorded music), the arranger
should certainly be compensated for the "performance" of the re-
cording.
ASPECTS OF DERIVATIVE WORKS
A derivative work is defined in Sec. 101 of the current Act as "a
work based upon one or more pre-existing works."19 A musical
arrangement is given as an example in the definition. Even if
"musical arrangement" had been omitted as an example, it is
quite clear that an arrangement is a form of derivative work. The
arranger takes a pre-existing musical composition and produces
an extensive work that is based on this prior composition. Since
an arrangement is a form of derivative work, aspects of law per-
taining to derivative works in general will be examined.
It should be noted here that a work which borrows from a prior
work is not necessarily a derivative work. To be considered a de-
rivative work, the subsequent work must borrow substantially
from a prior work.2 0 Professor Nimmer, in his copyright treatise,
provides an interesting alternative view of a derivative work. He
states that:
17. International Musician, May, 1979, at 1, col. 3; Variety, Oct. 4, 1978, at 88, col.
6; Daily Variety, August 5, 1977, at 3, col. 5.
18. Because musical works can be performed on such an extensive basis, a
copyright owner would find it impossible to adequately enforce his performing
rights by himself. Consequently, ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers) was founded in 1914, which enforces the composers' per-
formance rights. Simply stated, ASCAP is the assignee of its members, and
licenses the performing rights in the compositions of its members. Anyone who
intends to perform an ASCAP composition for profit in a non-dramatic manner
must obtain an ASCAP license. M. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW PERTAINING TO LITERARY, MuSIcAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, 221-22 (1971), [hereinafter NIMER].
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
20. M. NIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1978) [hereinafter NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT].
a work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be considered
an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a pre-existing
work had been taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such
pre-existing work.
2 1
The valid derivative work does not infringe because permission
has been obtained from the prior copyright owner or the pre-ex-
isting work is in the public domain.22 It follows that a work,
which does not qualify as a derivative work, would be separately
copyrightable as an independent and completely new work if the
standard of originality is met.23
Once a genuine derivative work is produced, problems arise as
to who has standing to bring suit for infringement of this work. In
essence, this is because we are dealing with two separate works-
the pre-existing work and the contributions made to it.
It is clear that if the defendant copies the material which has
been added to the prior work, the copyright in the derivative work
will be infringed. This is based on Sec. 103(b), which extends
copyright protection in derivative works "only to the material con-
tributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
pre-existing material employed in the work. . . ." Problems arise
when there has been substantial copying from the derivative
work of material that was originally part of the pre-existing work.
For example, if an infringer copies the musical additions and al-
terations contributed by the arranger, the arranger clearly has
standing to sue for this infringement. The confusion occurs when
the infringer copies only the underlying melody on which the en-
tire arrangement is based. The answer seems to lie in whether
the arranger was an exclusive or non-exclusive licensee of the
copyright owner. This stems from the current Act's recognition of
divisibility of copyright. 24 Since copyright is now divisible, the li-
censor has ceased to be the owner of such rights that are exclu-
sively licensed to the licensee. Hence, if the plaintiff is the
exclusive licensee in a particular medium, then he can sue for in-
fringement of the underlying work if the infringer is exploiting
the work in the same medium as the plaintiff-licensee. If the de-
21. Id. An infringing work is one which is substantially copied from another
copyrighted work. Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F.Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
22. "Public Domain" is generally defined as "the other side of the coin to copy-
right." It is best defined in negative terms. It lacks the element of private prop-
erty granted to copyright in that there is no restriction on others from making full
and complete use of the public domain material. It is, literally, "free as the air."
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 224.
23. See text accompanying note 27, infra, for discussion of originality.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2) (1976). Under the 1909 Act it was assumed that since
the Act speaks of a single "copyright", the rights which accrue to the copyright
owner are indivisible. Hence, only the entire copyright is "assignable," and any-
thing less than a total transfer is a mere "license." NIMMER, supra note 18, at 287-
91.
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fendant is infringing in a different medium, then only the owner
of the underlying work or his exclusive licensee in that medium
can bring suit. However, if the plaintiff is a non-exclusive licensee
of the underlying work, then he does not have standing to sue for
infringement of the underlying work. In this instance the doc-
trine of indivisibility of copyright remains intact.25
Applying these principles to the above example, it would seem
that if the licensee has the exclusive right to prepare printed ar-
rangements, he would not have standing to bring suit for infringe-
ment by a recording of the song itself. Only the owner of the
underlying work could sue in this instance since the infringement
occurred in a sufficiently different medium of expression.
Suppose that the defendant, even with a license to record the
song, proceeds to record the plaintiff's copyrighted published ar-
rangement. Although the new Act permits independent duplica-
tion of a recording 26 (i.e., transferring the sounds of the recorded
arrangement to manuscript paper and then recording the arrange-
ment with a new group of musicians), the defendant has not du-
plicated recorded sounds. He has infringed the plaintiff-licensee's
copyright in the arrangement and the licensee could sue for the
copying of his additions or alterations to the original composition.
ORIGINALITY
The single most important factor in obtaining copyright protec-
tion is that the work be the original product of the copyright
claimant.27 "Originality" has generally been defined as "in-
dependent creation," meaning simply that the work was created
independently by the author.28 In this section, the quantum of
25. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 3.05.
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976); see also, text accompanying notes 58-87, in-
ffra.
27. Also necessary for protection under the federal statute, is fixation in tangi-
ble form, notice, and publication (under the 1909 Act).
28. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 2.01. It is noteworthy that the
1909 Act nowhere expressly invoked the requirement of originality. The courts
reached this conclusion by interpreting "author" from the constitutional phrase
giving Congress the power to pass copyright legislation: "To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by serving for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.8. It is reasoned that the "author" is the "creator", thus requiring originality
to be an author. The 1976 Act provides in Sec. 102(a) that "copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression ......
originality needed to support copyright in a musical arrangement
will be examined. It will be evident that the courts are far from
consistent in their approach to this particular form of derivative
work. Some courts have subjected the musical arrangement to
excessive scrutiny and have set extremely high originality stan-
dards, almost approaching a "novelty" standard.29 Other deci-
sions reflect a complete disdain for weighing any creative effort,
resulting in copyright protection for the most minimal amount of
additional material.
Since a musical arrangement is a form of derivative work, as-
pects of originality pertaining to derivative works in general
should be examined. It is often stated that to support a copyright,
there must be more than a minimal contribution to the underly-
ing work.30 Professor Nimmer appears to support the view that
the applicable standard for determining the quantum of original-
ity needed is that of a "distinguishable variation."3 1 The dispute
over "quantum" of originality may come as a surprise if one re-
calls the famous Holmes' opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing C0.32 In this frequently cited opinion, Justice Holmes
expressed his view of originality and the role of the judiciary:33
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language
in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than
the judge....
It should be noted that Justice Holmes did not say that any
minimal expression of originality would be subject to copyright
protection. There is "a narrow area where admittedly independ-
ent efforts are deemed too trivial or insignificant to support copy-
right."34 The courts, then, still retain the power to pass judgment
on a work when it falls within these "narrow and most obvious
limits." And, the courts have not hesitated to express themselves
29. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 244, 283-84 (1952). This annotation discussed liter-
ary and artistic rights in connection with motion pictures, radio, and television. It
provides a brief discussion of musical arrangements (and originality) under the
1909 Act.
The term "novelty" is used here to connote unusualness, as opposed to in-
dependent creation (which is the requirement for copyright protection).
30. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976); Gerlach-Barklow
Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927).
31. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 3.03.
32. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
33. Id. at 241.
34. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 2.01(B).
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in this area. Mechanical toy banks,35 weight lifting charts, 36 and
chord charts,37 to name a few items, have been met with claims
that they lacked sufficient originality to be copyrighted. As the
court in Alfred Bell v. Catalda38 stated: "All that is needed to sat-
isfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' con-
tributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
something recognizably 'his own.'"
With the foregoing in mind, several cases dealing with original-
ity in musical arrangements will be examined. Two of the earliest
cases dealing with this aspect are Jollie v. Jacques39 and Wood v.
Boosey.40 In Jollie a German musical composition, the "Roschen
Polka," in the public domain, was re-arranged for piano and copy-
righted as "The Serious Family Polka." It was alleged that the de-
fendants were violating the plaintiff's copyright by the publication
and sale of the plaintiff's polkas. The defendants, in turn, claimed
that their composition was not a copy but was an original adap-
tion of the same German tune, and that the plaintiff's composition
was not subject to protection under the copyright law. In denying
the plaintiff's request for an injunction, the court stated that an
"original air requires genius for its construction; but a mere
mechanic in music, it is said, can make the adaption or accompa-
niment."4 1 The court espoused the view that a musical composi-
tion, to be copyrighted, must be substantially "a new and original
work; and not a copy of a piece already produced, with additions
and variations which a writer of music with experience and skill
might readily make."42
If the view of the Jollie court were followed it would seem that
no arrangement could ever be copyrighted. As long as the under-
lying work was already in existence, mere additions and varia-
tions by a skilled arranger would not meet the originality
standard here. This is an incredibly strict standard because the
court is requiring that the entire work must be original to be pro-
tected. Also, it appears that experience and skill is not a suff-
icient level of creativity to produce an original product.
35. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
36. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
37. Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
38. 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
39. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
40. 3 L.R. 223 (Q.B. 1867).
41. 13 F.Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
42. Id. at 914.
The English court in Wood recognized that an arranger is as
much an artist as was the original composer. The court acknowl-
edged the fact that "there is composition in the adaption to the
particular instrument," and that this adaption is the subject of
protection.43
The problem with cases subsequent to Jollie and Wood is that
the courts pay lip service to the principle handed down in Wood
(recognizing that arranging is an art form in itself) yet proceed to
apply the stricter test of the Jollie court.
The view of the Jollie court was strictly followed in the case of
Cooper v. James.44 The plaintiff, who had composed alto parts to
a public domain song book that utilized three-part harmony, was
denied copyright protection. The court, while recognizing that the
addition of the alto part would be an improvement to the song,
still held that this addition was not original and capable of being
protected. The court likened the arranger to a mechanic and
stated that "anything which a fairly good musician can make"4 5
would not be subject to copyright. While the addition of a fourth
harmony part could probably have been performed by a "fairly
good musician," a talented orchestrator could possibly compose
an addition which would place the entire composition in a new
light. The court here failed to examine the quality of the addi-
tional alto part or what kind of effect it had on the prior musical
composition. A later case, dealing with the adaption of a Russian
Hymn for choral use, resulted in a similar decision.46
More recently, Supreme Records brought suit against Decca
Records for unfair competition 4 7 in allegedly copying the arrange-
ment from the Supreme recording.48 The court, in discussing
whether a common law property right existed in a recorded ar-
rangement, proceeded to examine the arrangements themselves.
Although this is not a copyright case, the court's findings are cer-
tainly applicable to the issue of originality, and the case has been
cited as such. Judge Yankwich stated that the arrangement
"must involve creative ability of a distinct kind," before any rights
in it could be recognized.4 9 Hence, an introduction, handclapping,
43. Wood v. Boosey, 3 L.R. 223, 232 (Q.B. 1967).
44. 213 F. 871 (5th Cir. 1914).
45. Id. at 872.
46. Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D.C. Mass. 1936).
47. "Unfair Competition" are those trade practices which the law has desig-
nated as beyond the boundaries of legitimate competition. One of the more com-
mon actions under the heading of unfair competition is "passing off." This entails
misleading the public into believing that the goods and services of another are
those of the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 954 (4th ed. 1971).
48. Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
49. Id. at 913.
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choral responses, and a musical interlude were held not suffi-
ciently creative to be protected. In McIntyre v. Double-A Music
Corporation,50 an introduction, musical interludes, harmony, me-
lodic and harmonic embellishments, and an ending were held de
minimis contributions not qualifying for copyright.
In sharp contrast to the decisions above are Desclee & Cie, S.A.
v. Nemmers5 l and Consolidated Music v. Ashely.5 2 Desclee in-
volved an unfair competition suit to enjoin the photographic re-
production and sale of Gregorian chants with Solesmes rhythmic
annotations. 53 Why the plaintiff did not sue under the copyright
statute is puzzling; nevertheless the court stated: "The Solesmes
rhythmic annotations indicating the manner of performance of
the Gregorian chants are an integral part of the musical composi-
tion which may be copyrightable under the statute."5 4 Thus, mere
rhythmic markings were considered by this court to be worthy of
protection.
Similarly, in Consolidated Music, compilations of public domain
musical compositions for piano with editorial matter were held
protectable. Specifically, marks of fingering, phrasing, and ex-
pression were added to assist in understanding the mood and
structure of the piece, and to help in its performance. Although
the defendant argued that the fingering and phrasing marks were
standard and not additions to the original work,5 5 the court stated
that originality required slightly more than a trivial variation, and
this existed in the markings.56
Consolidated Music is particularly noteworthy inasmuch as
there would have been little or no audible difference if the addi-
tional matter had been omitted altogether. The fingering and
phrasing marks, while additions to the printed page, would proba-
bly not have affected the "sound" of the work.
The apparent confusion and dissimilarity in the "originality"
50. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
51. 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
52. 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
53. The Solemes method is a particular method of singing Gregorian chants
named after the monks at the Abbey of Solemes. It is a system of markings used
to make clear the ancient rhythm and to restore its manner of performance. APEL
AND DANIEL, THE HARVARD BRIEF DICTIONARY OF Music (1960).
54. 190 F. Supp. 381, 388 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
55. The author feels that the defendant is correct in this assertion inasmuch
as these marks are standard in many piano compositions.
56. 197 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
decisions result from a lack of understanding of the arranger's
function.5 7 While a simple piano introduction of four measures
may not be startlingly creative, it would be perfect for setting the
mood in a pensive ballad. However, it would sound totally out of
character in a "hard rock" song. These are the types of decisions
which an arranger makes when "packaging" a simple melody.
Likewise, the abilities and style of the performer must be taken
into consideration. This aspect of arranging music has been over-
looked by the courts which require a high degree of creativity. At
the same time, simple accent and phrasing marks are de minimis
and should not be protected, lest any change in a musical compo-
sition, no matter how trivial, would be subject to copyright protec-
tion.
There appear to be three approaches which can be used to
weigh the originality element in a musical arrangement. The "sig-
nificant creativity test" requires an in depth analysis of the ar-
ranger's contribution. The contribution to the underlying work
would have to involve "creative ability of a distinct kind."58 This
approach was used in Supreme Records, Jollie, and Cooper. A
heavy burden is placed on the court using this method since the
judge must weigh the actual musical contributions by the ar-
ranger and then compare them against the contributions of other
arrangers.
The "audio test" involves a comparison of the basic work
against the derivative work. If the arrangement, when played,
leaves an impression of newness or novelty when compared to
the underlying work, it will be subject to copyright. This is solely
a "listening" comparison, and problems may arise inasmuch as
arrangements typically involve various instruments which would,
of themselves, give a different impression by themselves. These
problems may be remedied by reducing the orchestration solely
to piano music, and then comparing the song as played on a piano
to the arrangement as played on the piano. Had this test been ap-
plied in Consolidated Music, it is almost certain that no infringe-
ment would have been found. It is submitted that this test is
more in line with the "distinguishable variation" test suggested
for derivative works by Professor Nimmer.5 9
57. The standard for achieving originality in the composition of popular songs
does not appear as strict as many of the "arrangement" decisions. Judge Yank-
wich stated in Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937)
that "originality in the realm of popular music lies within a very narrow scope.
Slight variations in the use of rhythm, or harmony-of accent and tempo-may
achieve it."
58. See text accompanying note 41, supra.
59. NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 3.03; see also text accompanying
note 31, supra.
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Perhaps a combination of the two approaches would work best.
The judge could examine the actual material contributed and
weight its creativity by the "audio impression" that it leaves. This
would allow the works in the Supreme and McIntyre cases to be
protected, and yet would exclude from protection the works in
Consolidated Music.
COMPULSORY LICENSE PROBLEMS
Given the public's familiarity and exposure to phonograph
records, it would seem obvious that these products would be pro-
tected by the copyright law. This, however, was not the case until
1972, when copyright protection for sound recordings was en-
acted.60 More basic than protection for the sounds embodied in
the recording would be protection for the musical compositions
which would be the subject of the recording. Prior to 1909,
though, there was no protection for songs with regard to record-
ing. Thus, it was possible for anyone to record a copyrighted
song, and to market the recording, without having to pay the
copyright owner for the use of his song. The passage of the Copy-
right Act of 1909, recognized the right to record a copyrighted mu-
sical composition as one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.6 1
The exclusive right of the copyright owner to reproduce his
compositions on records is, however, limited by the compulsory li-
cense provisions. Congress, apprehensive about creating a "great
music monopoly," 62 provided in Section 1(e) that if the copyright
owner used or permitted the use of a copyrighted composition for
mechanical reproduction, all others would be able to reproduce
the music on payment "of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part
manufactured." This section provides for compulsory licensing of
the copyrighted compositions when the appropriate provisions
are met. The extent of the use which can be made of a musical
composition within the scope of the compulsory license will be
60. Protection for sound recordings was enacted on February 15, 1972, by an
amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909. This applies to recordings fixed and pub-
lished on or after that date.
61. Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909 stated that the copyright owner
in the work shall have the exclusive right "to make any arrangement or setting of
it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which
the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or repro-
duced."
62. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1909).
discussed in the following section.63
Section 1(e) of the 1909 Act provides that once the copyright
owner has used or permitted the use of his work for mechanical
reproduction "any other person may make similar use of the
copyrighted work." The court, in Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A.
Mills, Inc.,64 discussed whether "similar use" encompassed a situ-
ation where the licensee's recording used both the words and mu-
sic, and the authorized recording was instrumental only. The
court recognized that it was the copyright owner's decision, as to
how the original reproduction was to be made (i.e., using the mu-
sic only, the words only, or both together). After he has deter-
mined this and granted the license to one person, others can
make similar use. The court held that if both words and music
are used in the original, then the licensee can use both the words
and music in his recording. If the original merely used the music,
then the licensee was restricted to this use in his recording. 65 Al-
though this decision has been criticized, it may still be applicable
to the current Act.
What if the authorized recording contains both the words and
the music? May the licensee produce a purely instrumental or vo-
cal version? In other words, the question is whether the licensee
has the right to produce his own arrangement of the composition
using words or music as he chooses. Nothing is mentioned in
Section 1(e) concerning the licensee's right to make his own mu-
sical arrangement. 66
This right, although generally assumed, was expressly recog-
nized in the case of Edward B. Marks Music Corporation v. Foul-
lon.67 The case involved copyright infringement of the musical
composition "Malaguena" in which the plaintiff had all rights and
had previously authorized recording of the song. The plaintiff's
suit was based on the contention that the right to make a musical
arrangement of a copyrighted composition is exclusively that of
the copyright owner and that the compulsory license provisions
do not include the right to make an arrangement. It was alleged
that the defendants, in preparing their own arrangement and us-
ing it commercially, were infringing plaintiff's copyright.68 The
court looked at Section 1(e) in light of the exclusive rights stated
63. For an excellent article on the 1909 compulsory license provision see Ev-
ANS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE RIGHT OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION OF MU-
SICAL COMPOSITIONS. (THIRD ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SyMp. 1940).
64. 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
65. Id. at 363.
66. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 20, at § 8.04(F).
67. 79 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), affid, 171 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1949).
68. 79 F. Supp. 664, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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in Section 1 (a), i.e., "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work." Section 1(e) specifically states that the right
to prepare an arrangement is "for the purposes set forth in sub-
section (a) hereof. . . ." The court held that it was "evident that
the separate and distinct right to make an arrangement and ver-
sion is limited to printing, reprinting, etc. It does not cover or in-
clude the right to mechanical reproduction." 69 The plaintiffs
contention would involve the addition of the right of mechanical
reproduction to subsection (a). The right to control the arrange-
ment used in the reproduction pursuant to the compulsory li-
cense would vest in the copyright owner and would create an
opportunity for the birth of "mechanical trusts."70 The court also
noted that the requirement of "similar use" has been liberally
construed to allow the composition to be adapted to a performer's
style.71
Wide latitude has been given to compulsory licensees in prepar-
ing their own arrangements. One such case permitted the defend-
ants to prepare and record "Latin" arrangements of such
standards as "Five Foot Two Eyes of Blue," "When You're Smil-
ing," and "Lazy River. '72 Additionally, several recent cases have
noted that the licensee has the right to alter a copyrighted work
in a manner consistent with the licensee's style or interpreta-
tion.7 3 Certainly the extent of the alterations permitted should be
justified by common sense and the rationale behind the compul-
sory license provision. If artists were unable to record their own
versions and arrangements of songs and were restricted to the au-
thorized recording only, numerous artists would undoubtedly
avoid recording those songs, resulting in a situation analogous to
a monopoly.
It has been shown that wide latitude is allowed in deviating
from a authorized recording. A related question regards the ex-
69. Id.
70. Id. The term "mechanical trusts" is referring to the monopoly which
would be created by recognizing the plaintiff's claim in this case.
71. See note 29, supra.
72. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Apollo Records, N.Y. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), affid, 418 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1969).
73. Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) "A li-
censee has the right so to alter a copyrighted work to suit his own style and inter-
pretation." Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976) "Courts have recognized that licensees are entitled to some small degree of
latitude in arranging the licensed work for presentation to the public in a manner
consistent with the licensee's style or standards."
tent of similarity allowed the compulsory licensee's recording. It
appears that a licensee may produce a recording identical to that
of the authorized recording; in effect, transcribing the arrange-
ment from the record and re-recording it.74 This reasoning is
based on the term "similar" (in "similar use") which connotes a
minimum standard, with "identical" being the maximum. It is
notew6rthy here that at least one reported case, Supreme Records
v. Decca Records,75 considered the possibility of a literary prop-
erty right in a recorded arrangement. The court seemed some-
what hesitant in reaching the conclusion that there should be no
property right in such a case. The court did, however, provide
clear (if not strict) guidelines as to the quantum of originality re-
quired in copyrighting an arrangement. 76
Suppose a compulsory licensee, in his quest to produce a "simi-
lar" work, decides to duplicate a recorded performance by elec-
tronic means (i.e., re-recording the authorized recording).7 7
There is nothing stated in the 1909 Act that leads one to believe
that the compulsory license should be withheld when a licensee
duplicates a musical work from the sound recording of another.
However, case of Duchess Music Corp. v. SternM7 8 held that the
Section 1(e) compulsory license in a musical work was not avail-
able to one who performed an identical duplication and that con-
duct of this nature was an infringement of the musical
composition.79
The Copyright Act of 190980 did not address the question of
whether a licensee who has recorded his own musical arrange-
ment of a composition can claim copyright in the notational ver-
sion underlying his record (i.e., the derivative work which he has
produced). This was examined in McIntyre v. Double-A Music
Corporation,81 the plaintiff recorded a composition pursuant to
the compulsory licensing provisions of the 1909 Act. The defend-
ants, who owned the copyright in the musical composition then
74. This is assuming, of course, that no unfair competition is found. See note
47 supra.
75. 90 F.Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
76. Id. at 909. See note 29 supra.
77. This practice is commonly referred to as record "piracy." The amendment
to the 1909 Act in 1972 established federal protection for sound recordings fixed on
or after February 15, 1972, thus making piracy of recordings a federal offense.
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 99.
78. 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972).
79. This has been referred to as the "Duchess Doctrine" and has been widely
criticized by commentators.
80. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER Top-
ics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC WORKS, 225
(3d ed. 1978).
81. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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released sheet music of the composition utilizing the plaintiff's re-
corded arrangement. The court discussed, in depth, the fact that
the plaintiff had never copyrighted his arrangement under the
federal statute and that all common law rights were lost with the
record's general publication. Apparently, if the plaintiff had copy-
righted his arrangement under the 1909 Act, he may have pre-
vailed in the infringement action.
The 1976 Copyright Act attempted to clarify the ambiguities
found in the 1909 Act. In Section 115 (the new compulsory license
section) the right to arrange the musical composition and to ad-
just it to the performer's manner and style of performance is ex-
pressly stated. It is also recognized that this right to arrange is a
limited freedom, and is not absolute. The Act provides that "the
arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the work .... "82 Even so, based on the decisions
under the 1909 Act, there would still seem to be a wide latitude
available to arrangers. In addition, it is made quite clear that the
arrangement prepared by the licensee is not subject to copyright
as a derivative work unless the express consent of the copyright
owner is obtained.83
It may also be possible, under the new Act that both the words
and the music may be used when the authorized recording uses
only the music. This departure from the case law84 under the 1909
Act may come about due to the omission of the phrase "similar
use" in the new Act. Therefore, anyone complying with Section
115 will be able to obtain a compulsory license to make and dis-
tribute phonorecords of the "work" as long as the arrangement
does not change the basic character of the "work."85 It would
82. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (1976) states:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrange-
ment of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or
manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrange-
ment shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under
this title, except with the express consent of the copyright owner.
83. Id.
84. Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917). See
text accompanying note 62, supra.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976) states:
When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed
to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright
owner, any other person may, by complying with the provisions of this
section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords
of the work. A person may obtain a compulsory license only if his or her
seem that the statute is referring to the work in general and not
to its particular authorized recording.
The new Act also resolves the question posed in Supreme
Records, regarding the existence of any property right in a re-
corded arrangement. Section 114, which deals with sound record-
ings, states that the exclusive rights of the copyright owner in the
sounU recording do not extend to other recordings which dupli-
cate the recorded performance through an independent fixation of
other sounds.86 The House Reports state that: "Mere imitation of
a recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringe-
ment even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate
another's performance as exactly as possible."87 A recorded mu-
sical arrangement, then, may be transcribed from a recording and
the identical arrangement recorded by other musicians. The ex-
act rationale behind this provision is not clear but may be in re-
sponse to practical considerations in the music industry (i.e., the
notational version underlying the recorded arrangement is not
usually copyrighted).
The 1976 Copyright Act also provides that sound recordings are
the subject of copyright protection 88 and that the compulsory li-
cense is not applicable to one who "pirates" a sound recording
(duplicating a sound recording fixed by another). 89 This results
in the pirate infringing the copyright in the sound recording by
the unauthorized duplication, and the copyright in the musical
work contained in the recording.
THE ADAPTION RIGHT
What happens when a musical performer acquires from the
copyright owner the right to publicly perform the work but no
other rights? Does the performer have the right to prepare his
own arrangements, alter the lyrics or render any type of change
in the basic work? The answer lies in an analysis of the "adaption
right."
primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the pub-
lic for private use. A person may not obtain a compulsory license for use
of the work in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound recording
fixed by another, unless: (i) such sound recording was fixed lawfully and
(ii) the making of the phonorecords was authorized by the owner of copy-
right in the sound recording or, if the sound recording was fixed before
February 15, 1972, by any person who fixed the sound recording pursuant
to an express license from the owner of the copyright in the musical work
or pursuant to a valid compulsory license for use of such work in sound
recording.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976).
87. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 106 (1976).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (1976).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976).
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The 1976 Act in Section 106 states that the copyright owner has
in addition to his other rights, the exclusive right "to prepare de-
rivative works based on the copyrighted work." The 1909 Act
stated that the copyright owner had the exclusive right to "make
any other version" of the work and "to arrange or adapt it if it be
a musical work." These provisions and case law holding that a
grant (transfer or license) of a right under the Act does not de-
tract from the copyright owner's right to invoke rights not
granted, leaves one with the proposition that a mere grant of the
performance right is not a grant of the right to prepare derivative
works. 90 It is possible then, that should the performer in the
above example alter the lyrics or prepare his own arrangement of
the song, his action would constitute an infringement of the adap-
tion right.
There are no reported cases dealing with this problem, and it is
questionable whether the courts would recognize such an in-
fringement.91 After all, the performance of a musical composition
by an artist would require some minimal arrangement, even if he
was accompanied solely by a piano or other rhythm instrument.
The courts may feel that such a situation is analogous to the right
to prepare arrangements and provide for performer latitude under
the compulsory license provisions of the 1909 Act.92 Nevertheless,
the prudent attorney should obtain from the copyright owner an
express grant permitting his client the right to make any changes
in the basic work necessary to its performance.
IMITATION OF PERFORMER'S STYLE
Analogous to the "sound-alike" recording is the imitation of a
particular performer's style by others.9 3 In many cases, this in-
volves an imitation of the performer's musical arrangement, since
this is most likely where his "style" stems from. This imitation of
style and musical arrangements have been used often in the field
of commercial jingles.9 4 These are the catchy songs heard daily
90. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 187 U.S.P.O. 22 (D.C. Ariz. 1975); Schwartz v.
Broadcast Music, Inc. 187 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
91. NIMMER ON COPYmIGHT, supra note 20, at § 8.09(A).
92. See text accompanying note 7, supra.
93. See Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property, 60 A.B.A.J.
198 (1974).
94. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 1, at 285.
on radio and television which extoll the virtues of manufacturer's
products.
The use of a particular musical composition in an advertise-
ment requires synchronizing the music with the film or announce-
ment. So, in addition to a general ASCAP license 95 for use of the
song, a synchronization license is required from the music pub-
lisher.96 Once this license is obtained, the advertiser may want to
imitate a particular performer's arrangement and style.
There are two well known cases where the recording artists
brought suit claiming a property right in their version and ar-
rangement of a song. In Davis v. Trans World Airlines,97 the de-
fendant (TWA) utilized modified lyrics of the song "Up, Up and
Away" in radio and television commercials. The defendants had
acquired a license to use the copyrighted music and lyrics from
the music publisher. The plaintiffs, members of the singing group
known as "The Fifth Dimension," claimed that TWA had imitated
the plaintiff's recorded performance and brought suit for "passing
off,"98 that is, passing off the defendant's commercials as that of
the plaintiff's. The court dismissed the suit by stating that "imita-
tion alone does not give rise to a cause of action." 99
Soon after Davis the Ninth Circuit decided the case of Sinatra
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 100 Plaintiff Nancy Sinatra had
recorded a song entitled "These Boots Are Made for Walking"
which had become a commercial success. Goodyear adopted the
term "wide boots" to describe its tires, and used the music and
revised lyrics from "These Boots Are Made for Walking," in its ra-
dio 4nd television commercials. The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendalnts had simulated her singing style and musical
arrangement. The copyright in the song was, at all times, owned
by a music publisher who had licensed both the plaintiff and de-
fendants to use the music and lyrics. As in Davis the suit was for
the tort of "passing off" (a form of unfair competition). The court
found no unfair competition, noting that holding for the plaintiff
might result in potential licenses losing interest in the song.'O' If
all artists who had ever performed the song could claim unfair
competition, prospective licensees might be discouraged from us-
ing the song. 0 2
95. See NIMMER, supra note 18.
96. Id.
97. 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
98. See note 47 supra.
99. Id. at 1147.
100. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
101. Id. at 718.
102. Id.
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There have also been two cases, decided by the New York
Courts of Appeals, concerning the style of "swing bands" of the
1930's and 40's. Miller v. Universal Pictures0 3 found that the
widow of bandleader Glenn Miller did not have any property in-
terest in the Glenn Miller "sound." The case, however, was re-
solved on contract principles which resulted in a decision for
Miller's widow. Fourteen years later the same court stated, simi-
larly, that bandleader Artie Shaw did not have any property inter-
est in the Artie Shaw "sound" and that, absent unfair
competition, others were free to copy and re-record the original
arrangements.l0 4
The underlying theory of these "imitation" decisions appears to
be based on the reluctance of the courts to "segment" the copy-
right in the song. If the mere licensee of a song were permitted to
bring suit, the ownership of copyright in the song would, in effect,
be divided among any number of people. This would result, as
the court noted in Sinatra, in confusion and reluctance among po-
tential licensees to use the original song. The court, in Supreme
Records, recognized this problem and addressed it with an anal-
ogy to the theatre: 0 5
If recognition were given to the right of ownership in a musical arrange-
ment ... we would have to hold that Mr. Charles Loughton, for instance,
could claim the right to forbid anyone else from imitating has creative
mannerisms in his famous characterization of Henry VIII, or Sir Laurence
Olivier could prohibit anyone else from adopting some of his innovations
which he brought to the performance of Hamlet.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the arranger plays a significant role within the
music industry. His expertise is necessary in the publishing, re-
cording and performance of music. However, the reported cases
have tended to show a general confusion concerning the exact
function of an arranger and a lack of appreciation for his specific
talents. The courts have encountered a great deal of difficulty
when dealing with the originality aspect of musical arrangements.
This difficulty has resulted in a lack of protection for many crea-
tive works.
The compulsory license section of the 1909 Act created a meas-
103. 11 App. Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 632 (1960), affd, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 224 N.Y.S.
2d 662, 180 N.E. 2d 248 (1961).
104. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817 (1975).
105. 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
ure of confusion which may be resolved by the 1976 Copyright
Act. The new sections dealing with copyright protection for
sound recordings have also helped clarify other murky areas
within the 1909 Act. However, Section 114 which permits in-
dependent duplication of sound recordings should be given addi-
tional consideration to protect the arranger's product inasmuch as
the current law affords no protection for musical arrangements in
the field of sound recording.
Hopefully Congress will soon officially recognize the impor-
tance of the arranger's work in the field of popular music and en-
act legislation that will allow the arranger to realize performance
royalties.
JOEL L. FRIEDMAN
